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Toute décolonisation est une réussite 
Les damnés de la terre and the African Spring 
Anthony C. Alessandrini 
Kingsborough Community College – City University of New York 
I’m certainly not alone in noting that the year 2011 brings, for those of us 
who are students of the work of Frantz Fanon, two different anniversaries. 
This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Les damnés de la 
terre, Fanon’s final book and, for many, his most lasting achievement. But it 
also marks the fiftieth anniversary of Fanon’s death: he died, tragically 
young, on December 6, 1961, not long after the book’s publication. It is no 
exaggeration to say that Les damnés de la terre was composed by Fanon from 
his deathbed, and that he was well aware that he was racing death as he 
rushed to complete the manuscript, as his publisher François Maspero 
remarked, “in pitiful haste.”1 Fanon had managed to complete it by July, 
although, as he told a friend, “I should have liked to have written something 
more.”2 As David Macey notes in his indispensable biography, “Fanon did 
see copies of his last book, but for its first readers, Les damnés de la terre was a 
posthumous work.”3 The book and Fanon’s death thus come to us bound 
inextricably together, fifty years later. 
So it would seem that we have an anniversary to celebrate (and in doing 
so, we would thus be celebrating the continuing relevance of a classic work, 
as this special issue intends us to do), but also a death to mourn. If I proceed 
to make a suggestion that will seem at first to be the height of perversity, let 
me preface it by saying that this suggestion is occasioned by what I believe 
to be Fanon’s greatest legacy, a legacy of unsparing intellectual and political 
commitment. For I want to begin by suggesting that this year brings us the 
mournful fact that fifty years on, Les damnés de la terre remains, in many 
ways, as relevant to our contemporary world as it was in 1961; but 
conversely, the anniversary of Fanon’s death offers us a cause for 
celebration. 
Let me get to the mournful half of this equation first: Why should we 
mourn the continuing relevance of Fanon’s final book? As many of the most 
perceptive readers of Les damnés de la terre have noted, at its heart, Fanon’s 
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book contains an essentially tragic narrative. As Fanon moves us through 
each of the stages of the anti-colonial struggle — “De la violence,” 
“Grandeur et faiblesses de la spontanéité,” “Mésaventures de la conscience 
nationale” — what he is describing is a gradual process by which the anti-
colonial struggle, which was founded with such high hopes, goes 
progressively and inexorably downhill; his language informs us, not that 
everything may go wrong, but that everything will go wrong in the quest for 
what he describes repeatedly in the text as “true liberation.” The fourth 
chapter, “Sur la culture nationale,” seems to hold out more hope, in 
describing the development of a form of national culture that Fanon takes 
pains to differentiate from nationalism, but even here, the conditions of this 
possibility are linked precisely to the need for true liberation: “On ne peut 
vouloir le rayonnement de la culture africaine si l’on ne contribute pas 
concrètement à l’existence des conditions de cette culture, c’est-à-dire à 
libération du continent.”4 And the book’s penultimate chapter, “Guerre 
coloniale et troubles mentaux,” is a set of case studies that set out in 
unsettling and unsparing detail the psychic as well as the physical toll of the 
anti-colonial struggle, effects that Fanon promises will leave a deep and 
lasting legacy: “nous aurons à panser des années encore les plaies multiples 
et quelquefois indélébiles faites à nos peuples par le déferlement 
colonialiste.”5 Even the methodology of Fanon’s book itself shows signs of 
the toll taken by the struggle: at the beginning of the chapter, faced with the 
accusation that the inclusion of psychiatric case studies in this book might 
appear to some readers to be inopportune or untimely, Fanon simply throws 
up his hands, defying the call to clarify any further: “On trouvera peut-être 
inopportunes et singulièrement déplacées dans un tel livre ces notes de 
psychiatrie. Nous n’y pouvons strictement rien.”6 
I am, of course, exaggerating one strand of Fanon’s text for polemical 
reasons. The book’s conclusion is the place where Fanon, having shown his 
readers scenes of death, decay, and destruction, exhorts us to the making of 
an entirely new future, calling upon his readers to find something different: 
“Allons, camarades, le jeu européen est définitivement terminé, il faut 
trouver autre chose.”7 As Lewis R. Gordon has put it in his appreciative 
study of Fanon’s attempt to create a new form of humanism, “Man needs to 
emerge out of the ashes of the fact of his dessication.”8 Fanon’s entire 
argument in Les damnés de la terre is that the condition of this emergence is 
the form of political independence that can only be brought about through 
the anti-colonial struggle, and that from this struggle will emerge the 
conditions of possibility for a new humanism; as he puts it near the end of 
the chapter on colonial war and mental disorders, “Quand la nation démarre 
en totalité, l’homme nouveau n’est pas une production a posteriori de cette 
nation mais coexiste avec elle, se développe avec elle, triomphe avec elle.”9 
But I still must insist upon the deep sense of complexity that Fanon presents 
us with, even at such seemingly triumphant moments as this, since he 
follows this statement with one that clarifies the precise role played by 
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“independence” in this process: “L’indépendence n’est pas un mot à 
exorciser mais une condition indispensable à l’existence des hommes et des 
femmes vraiment libérés c’est- à-dire mâitres de tous les moyens matériels 
qui rendent possible la transformation radicale de la société.”10 National 
independence is the indispensable condition for the human liberation that 
Fanon is calling us towards, but he takes pains to point out that 
“independence” itself is not some magic word that will set the colonized 
free. 
Allow me to state the obvious: this form of political independence, one 
that constitutes a true liberation, has yet to be realized in much of the post-
colonial world, especially in post-colonial Africa. As Ato Sekyi-Otu puts it 
towards the end of his fine book on Fanon, “the history of postcolonial 
societies in the African world is a history of unspeakable disaster,” and 
furthermore, “the omens of catastrophe were all too visible to Fanon.”11 A 
fully-responsive reading of Les damnés de la terre must take this fact into 
account; while Fanon’s conclusion, with its stirring rhetoric, might lead us to 
believe that we can simply align ourselves with a form of postcolonial 
humanism that has already come into existence, we must not forget that the 
necessary condition for this postcolonial humanism, a state of true political 
independence, has not yet arrived — The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born, to 
quote the title of a very Fanonian novel by the great Ghanaian novelist Ayi 
Kwei Armah.12 Armah’s own appreciative reading of Fanon focuses squarely 
upon his predictions regarding the inevitable failure of political 
independence in Africa: “Independence did not mean that [an] enslaving 
relationship was destroyed. . . . The African ruling classes do not rule in the 
interests of African people. If they function at all, they function as agents of 
white power.” In other words, Armah suggests, what has come to be called 
“independence” merely signified a shifting of “the colonial machine 
shredding Africa into neocolonial gear.”13  
This is the paradox at the heart of Fanon’s argument in Les damnés de la 
terre: as Macey puts it, “whilst Fanon constantly prophesies the victory of the 
people, the theoretical model he adopts necessarily implies that the group 
unity on which that victory is based cannot be sustained.” This is at least in 
part because of the vitiating role to be played by the leaders of the new post-
colonial nation, and as a result, as Macey puts it, “Fanon foresaw that the 
post-independence period would be difficult and dangerous.”14 What he 
may not have foreseen is that fifty years later, this post-independence period 
would have shown so few signs of any shift towards the victory of the 
people, and towards a true liberation. So this is the mournful aspect of Les 
damnés de la terre, and of its continued relevance: if the book continues to be 
useful in analyzing our contemporary political moment fifty years after its 
publication, this is at least in part because we have done depressingly little 
during this half-century to advance beyond the neocolonial outcome that 
was so accurately predicted by Fanon. 
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This concludes the “pessimism of the intellect” portion of my analysis. 
But there is also optimism of the will, and this is where we have a different 
responsibility to Fanon’s legacy, one that does call for a celebration of sorts. 
For I want to suggest that Fanon is relevant, fifty years after his death, to our 
very particular political moment in a way that would not necessarily have 
been as readily apparent even a few months back. It was during the first few 
weeks of 2011 that the popular revolution in Tunisia began, followed by 
another in Egypt, alongside the emergence of various revolutions, revolts, 
and uprisings throughout the region that continue as I write this in early 
April. In many cases (most horrifically, in Libya), the outcome of these 
revolutions still hangs in the balance. It is in this context that I offer a quote 
from the other key strand of Les damnés de la terre, the one that suggests that 
in spite of all the obstacles, pitfalls, and misadventures that will play an 
unavoidable part, the larger process of decolonization is, to put it simply, 
unstoppable: 
Dans décolonisation, il y a donc exigence d’une remise en question 
intégrale de la situation coloniale. Sa définition peut, si on veut la 
décrire avec précision, tenir dans la phrase bien connue: << les 
derniets seront les premiers >>. La décolonisation est las 
vérification de cette phrase. C’est pourquoi, sur le plan de la 
description, toute décolonisation est une réussite.15 
This passage ends with one of Fanon’s many misleadingly simple 
statements, of the sort that pepper the first half of Les damnés de la terre, 
giving the book an almost epigrammatic quality at times. It comes from the 
first few pages of the book; Fanon makes this declaration at the end of a 
section and simply moves on to his next point without further explication. 
In what way is it possible to state that at the descriptive level, any 
decolonization is a success? It seems to have something to do with Fanon’s 
cannily lifted phrase from the New Testament, “the last shall be first.” Even 
more so, it has to do with the importance of that level that Fanon names as 
“le plan de la description.” What is the role played by description in 
revolution? As Benjamin reminded us, the French revolution introduced a 
new calendar to mark the beginning of a new time (Fanon followed suit in 
his account of the Algerian Revolution, entitling his second book L’an V de la 
révolution algérienne).16 We can find the same impetus to transform the world 
at the level of description in the statement made by an Egyptian protester 
preparing for the demonstration on January 25, the event that in effect set 
the Egyptian revolution in motion: “Starting today, 25th January, I take 
charge of the affairs of my country.”17 At the level of fact, needless to say, the 
struggle for control of the affairs of the country is ongoing in Egypt. But at 
the level of description – and this is what I take to be Fanon’s point – 
something is set irrevocably in motion by such a declaration.  
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In Tunisia, in Egypt, in Libya, and in many other parts of the region, 
this has been described again and again by participants in these popular 
uprisings as the process by which the “fear barrier” has been broken. Once 
this threshold has been breached, no matter what the outcome of these 
revolutions, things simply cannot return to their previous state.18 For a high-
ranking police official, this is what distinguished, at the level of description, 
the uprising of January 25 from the previous demonstrations that had become 
familiar to the police: “What we saw on January 25 was an uprising, not a 
demonstration. A young man standing in front of an armored vehicle, 
jumping on it to strike it, falling off and then doing it again? Honestly, there 
was no fear.”19 At the descriptive level, every decolonization is a success: 
that is Fanon’s first lesson for today, echoed by the revolutionaries of our 
moment: “We, the sons of workers and farmers, are stronger than the 
criminals,” in the words of a Tunisian protester, or, from Tahrir Square in 
Cairo at the height of the uprising: “Before, I used to watch television, now 
it’s the television who is watching me.”20 
It was during the early days of these uprisings that I encountered 
Mohammed Bamyeh’s essential dispatches from the revolutions in Tunisia 
and Egypt alongside his contribution to a fine special issue of Theory, Culture 
& Society dedicated to Fanon’s work.21 Reading Bamyeh’s account of the 
revolution in Tunisia as “a genuine popular revolution, spontaneous and 
apparently leaderless, yet sustained and remarkably determined,” and his 
observation that in the Egyptian uprising, “spontaneity thus became the 
compass of the Revolution and the way by which it found its way to what 
turned out to be its radical destination,” the connection to Fanon, the great 
theorist of spontaneous revolution, was readily apparent to me. But I had 
already been thinking of Fanon from the beginning of these uprisings, and 
continue to do so. So the rest of this article will be dedicated to bringing Les 
damnés de la terre into conversation with our current political conjecture, one 
which has been dubbed “the Arab spring” and which I would like, in honor 
of this Fanonian anniversary, to tweak slightly, into “the African spring.”  
Commentators and analysts who have sought for a regional aspect to 
the popular uprisings of the past few months have generally described an 
“Arab Revolution” or, in Lamis Andoni’s words, the “resurrection” of “a 
new sense of pan-Arabism based on the struggle for social justice and 
freedom.”22 This seems apt. But I wonder whether Fanon might not also 
want to describe current events, were he here to observe them, as a version 
of what he called the African Revolution. In a time when we have become 
accustomed to “the Middle East” as a taken-for-granted spatial designation 
(one belied, of course, by the roundness of the globe), it is easy to lose sight 
of the geographical specificity shared by many recent sites of popular 
uprisings and demonstrations, including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, and 
Morocco. This loss of geographical specificity may be part of what prompted 
the confusion in Fox News’ now-infamous map of the region (which actually 
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dates back to 2009), showing Egypt sitting between Iran and Syria, in place 
of Iraq.23 After all, how could Egypt be in Africa? It’s a “Middle Eastern” 
country. 
Putting Egypt back in Africa (without taking it out of the Middle East) 
might become part of our analytic work to come. Perhaps one of the many 
things now made possible by these popular revolts is the broaching of the 
intellectual cordon sanitaire set up between the “North Africa” that has been 
subsumed into the standard definition of “the Middle East” and the “Sub-
Saharan Africa” that has been, by comparison, largely neglected by political 
analysts, even those of a progressive stripe. In Les damnés de la terre, Fanon 
diagnosed this division of the continent into “l’Afrique Blanche” and 
“l’Afrique Noire” as one of the most harmful legacies that the new 
postcolonial elite would inherit (and subsequently reconstitute) from the 
colonial rulers: 
On divise l’Afrique en une partie blanche et une partie noire. Les 
appellation de substitution: Afrique au Sud ou au Nord du Sahara 
n’arrivent pas à cacher ce racisme latent. Ici, on affirme que 
l’Afrique Blanche a une tradition de culture millénaire, qu’elle est 
méditerranéenne, qu’elle prolonge l’Europe, qu’elle participe de la 
culture gréco-latine. On regarde l’Afrique Noire comme une région 
interte, brutale, non civilisée . . . sauvage. Là, on entend à longueur 
de journée des réflexions odieuses sur le voile des femmes, sur la 
polygamie, sur le mépris supposé des Arabes pour le sexe feminin. 
. . . La bourgeoisie nationale de chacune de ces deux grandes 
régions, qui a assimilé jusqu’aux racines les plus pourries de la 
pensée colonialiste, prend le relais des Européens et installe sur le 
continent une philosophie raciste terriblement préjudiciable pour 
l’avenir de l’Afrique.24 
It is worth recalling that as Fanon was completing The Wretched of the Earth 
in Tunis, where the FLN in exile maintained its precarious existence, his 
vision was one of uniting Africa across the divisions that were themselves 
the concrete effects of the Western “scramble for Africa.” This was not just a 
theoretical concern for Fanon; on a practical level, he proposed a scheme for 
opening up a “southern front” for the Algerian Revolution, on the border 
with Mali, for shipments of arms and, in Fanon’s mind, for African forces 
from the south to engage with French forces in southern Algeria. Fanon 
actually made a trip along an ancient supply road that he imagined could be 
used for such purposes, recorded in his journals and posthumously 
published as “This Africa to Come.”25  
While the uprisings that have gotten the most attention thus far have all 
been located in North Africa, there are signs that the African spring has the 
potential to spread throughout the continent. After all, there are plenty of 
authoritarian regimes throughout Africa currently supported by the U.S. 
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that are surely alarmed by the results of popular revolts in Egypt and 
Tunisia; indeed, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has 
ruled Equatorial Guinea since he took over in a coup in 1979 (and who has 
been warmly received in recent years by both Condoleezza Rice and Barack 
Obama), at a certain point ordered the state-controlled media to stop 
reporting on Egypt altogether.26 There have also been some more concrete 
examples. For example, there have been massive protests in Gabon: in 
January, thousands of protestors turned out in opposition to the regime of 
Ali Bongo Ondimba, who inherited the presidency in 2009 from his father, 
Omar Bongo, the president since 1967. In Djibouti, the site of large U.S. and 
French military bases, thousands of protesters, in a country with a 
population of less than a million people, took part in demonstrations in 
February demanding the resignation of President Ismail Omar Guelleh, 
among other political reforms.27 There have also been protests and 
demonstrations directly inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt in Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and Cameroon. In some cases, the uprisings began earlier: in Ivory 
Coast, there have been at least 300 people killed in protests surrounding a 
disputed presidential election that have been ongoing since November 2010. 
Of course, there is no hard and fast link that can be made between these 
many uprisings and the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, and certainly no 
sense yet that one can talk about anything so unified as a single “African 
Revolution.” But in the words of Emmanuel Kisiangani, “The uprisings . . . 
are making people on the continent become conscious about their abilities to 
define their political destinies.”28 Fanon’s dream of a revolution that could 
bridge “White Africa” and “Black Africa” is starting to look rather less far-
fetched. 
But it is not only because he reminds us of the African context of these 
revolutions that Fanon should have a place in our thinking today. His richly 
ambivalent reflections on the role of spontaneity in revolutionary 
movements – what he referred to as the “grandeur” and “weakness” of 
spontaneity – remain valuable in thinking through the almost unimaginable 
events that have been brought about in recent weeks through popular 
struggles, as well as helping us to anticipate and understand some of the 
struggles to come. And, as I’ll note in my conclusion, Fanon’s own example, 
in terms of his commitment to the Algerian Revolution, has shown the 
power to outlast his death. 
Of course, there are crucial differences between the anti-colonial 
struggle in Algeria that was Fanon’s touchstone and the uprisings of today, 
but as I’ve noted, one of Fanon’s great strengths was in anticipating and 
analyzing the post-colonial regimes that would come to inherit (steal, Fanon 
would say) newly-independent states throughout Africa. These post-colonial 
leaders, in Fanon’s account, look very much like the Ben Alis and Mubaraks 
of today, right down to their friendly relationships with leaders of the 
former colonial powers. Fanon is at his most scathing in delineating these 
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neocolonial relationships, as in his description of the “independence” 
achieved by the Republic of Gabon in 1960: 
Alors, de la discussion autour du tapis vert, surgit la promotion 
politique qui permet à M. M’ba, président de la République du 
Gabon, de dire très solennellement à son arrivée en visite officielle 
à Paris: << Le Gabon est indépendant, mais entre le Gabon et la 
France rien n’est change´, tout continue comme avant >>. De fait, le 
suel changement c’est que M. M’ba est président de la République 
gabonaise et qu’il est reçu par le président de la République 
française.29    
Watching the former French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie trying to 
explain her vacation in Tunis as the guest of Ben Ali and friends (even while 
protesters were being killed in the streets by the regime) or Hillary Clinton 
trying to back away from her remarks that she considered Mubarak and his 
wife to be “friends of the family,” Fanon would certainly recognize the 
continuity with the first generation of post-colonial leaders, who he 
described as acting as “party organizers” for Western leaders with a taste for 
exoticism, hunting, and casinos: “La bourgeoisie nationale organise des 
centres de repos et de délassement, des cures de plaisir à l’intention de la 
bourgeoisie occidentale.”30 In the Republic of Gabon, meanwhile, the 
struggle against the newest phase of this neocolonial legacy continues 
today.31 
There’s much more that could be said about all this, but I’ll end with 
two moments from Fanon’s analysis of spontaneity that have flashed into 
my mind repeatedly in recent months, and that mark moments of his legacy 
to be celebrated today. The first is a moment that I have come to think about 
very differently since Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak finally bowed to the popular 
demand for him to step down. This moment from Les damnés de la terre 
comes in the midst of Fanon’s analysis of what he sees as an early stage of 
the anti-colonial struggle, when popular unrest has begun to coalesce 
around particular demands, including demands for the release of anti-
colonial leaders who have been detained by the colonial regime. At a certain 
point, Fanon explains, the colonial powers decide to release these leaders 
and start negotiations, and thus, as Fanon puts it, “L’heure des bals 
populaires a commencé.”32 
It is only now – literally since watching the jubilation that followed 
Mubarak’s resignation – that I feel able to appreciate the fully dialectical 
nature of Fanon’s insight here. Previously, I had caught only Fanon’s caustic 
irony. He certainly leads us in this direction through his analysis of the play 
of forces found in the particular moment of the struggle that precedes the 
dancing in the streets: “Le peuple colonisé, qui avait spontanément investi 
sa violence dans la tàche colossale de destruction du système colonial, va se 
retrouver en peu de temps avec le mot d’ordre inerte, infécond : << Libérez 
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X ou Y >>.”33 In this account, the grandeur of spontaneity, inspired by the 
concrete experiences of immiseration that are constitutive of colonialism, has 
been betrayed by its weakness, the inability to think through the long-term 
results of certain slogans and campaigns. This dancing looks dangerously 
premature, as underlined by the phrase’s very placement in the first pages of 
the first chapter of a book outlining a long and violent struggle still to come. 
But the literal dancing in the streets of Cairo has put Fanon’s phrase in a 
very different light for me, revealing the dialectical opposite of this first 
interpretation. For even if a certain “sterility” and “passivity” can be 
detected in the slogan “Free X or Y!” it is nevertheless true that it is only the 
spontaneous revolt of masses of people that brings this outcome to pass. The 
same has shown itself to be true in the streets of Tunisia and Egypt. Simply 
shouting “Ben Ali dégage” or “Irhal Ya Mubarak” (or even the slogan 
eventually taken up and echoed throughout the region: “The people want to 
overthrow the regime”) is not in and of itself sufficient political analysis for 
a sustained revolutionary uprising. But it is undeniable that it was only mass 
popular action that sent Ben Ali packing to Saudi Arabia, and Mubarak 
sulking to Sharm el-Sheikh en route to his next destination. To not celebrate 
the sheer breathtaking nature of these accomplishments is to ignore, and 
thus betray, the spontaneous energy that has allowed the revolutions in 
Tunisia and Egypt to sustain themselves, energy that will be badly needed in 
the days and months and years ahead. In this account, the dancing in the 
street is hardly premature; it is a way of marking the grandeur of a 
spontaneity that must be carefully maintained once the dancing has ended 
and the slight but pleasant hangover has subsided. 
The protesters in Tunisia and Egypt are the last ones who need to be 
reminded of the cautionary aspect of Fanon’s point here. Members of the 
Tunisian opposition have been zealous in trying to protect their place in the 
political changes that are underway and in guarding against the return to 
power of Ben Ali’s RCD Party. In Egypt, the protesters, even as they held on 
to the streets for many days, managed to issue clear, substantial, and long-
term demands. Since Mubarak’s resignation, Egyptian protesters have on a 
number of occasions refused the military’s appeal to desist from assembling 
in Tahrir Square, choosing to use their leverage to call for a swift transition 
to civilian rule. Prominent voices from within the protests have refused the 
invitation to return to “normalcy” since Mubarak’s ouster, and certainly the 
numerous strikes and labor protests that played a major part in the uprising 
show no sign of abating.34 Most recently, police fired live ammunition at 
protesters holding a sit-in in Tahrir Square, killing at least one and injuring 
seventy-one, and suggesting the possibility that more state violence aimed at 
the protesters, and ultimately a major confrontation between the popular 
movement and the army, is not out of the question.35 
Indeed, if anyone needs a Fanonian reminder of the potentially 
premature nature of dancing in the streets, it may be those of us who have 
2 0  |  T o u t e  d é c o l o n i s a t i o n  e s t  u n e  r é u s s i t e  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.474 
been drawn to the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and the rest of the 
region from the United States. Given the hugely powerful role of U.S. 
money, weaponry, and political influence throughout the region, there is a 
great deal to be accomplished from here in solidarity with these ongoing 
democratic uprisings. In this context, one last moment from Fanon is in 
order. At a later point in his analysis of spontaneity, at a moment when the 
anti-colonial movement has begun to gain momentum, Fanon pauses to note 
the comments of Western observers, even sympathetic ones, in response to 
the pace of these movements. It’s a moment marked by Fanon’s trademark 
irony, but it also partakes of some of the fearless jubilation of our present 
moment: “On dit alors que les colonisés veulent aller trop vite. Or ne 
l’oublions jamais, il n’y a pas bien longtemps on affirmait leur lenteur, leur 
paressse, leur fatalisme.”36 
Adapting Fanon to the current moment, and to, say, the context of 
Egypt, we might re-translate him this way: Today they say that the Egyptian 
people want to move too fast towards true democracy. Let us never forget 
that it was only yesterday Egyptians were accused of being too slow, too 
lazy, and too fatalistic for true democracy. The racist truisms, remnants of 
colonialism and Orientalism, that have informed Western thinking about so-
called “Arab (and African) fatalism,” “Arab (and African) passivity,” “Arab 
(and African) backwardness” as explanations for autocratic regimes like 
those ousted by the people of Tunisia and Egypt have now been burned to 
the ground; their remains lie next to the ashes of the NDP headquarters in 
Cairo, and they have been laid to rest equally effectively alongside the 
dismantled offices of the CDR in Tunisia.  
Fanon’s greatest legacy, I would suggest, is one of solidarity, in the 
truest sense of the word. Les damnés de la terre is unsparing in its critique of 
the weaknesses, blind spots, and sloppy thinking that he often diagnosed in 
the popular struggle for decolonization. At the same time, he put this 
critique completely at the service of the Algerian Revolution. This is the 
example he leaves us today. In the face of calls for “stability” – which has 
been the term most often used by those who see the need for a slowing 
down of the current revolutions – he reminds us that decolonization 
represents nothing less than a complete overturning of the existing world: 
“The last shall be first.” In place of a commitment to stability in the present, 
he calls us towards a commitment to the future that has not yet come. 
In bringing the impossible to pass, the people of Tunisia and Egypt, and 
their fellow protesters throughout the region, have moved faster than many 
of us dreamed possible. In the months to come, after the euphoria passes, 
there will be calls for them to slow down, in the interests of “stability.” Our 
job, as Fanon reminds us, will be precisely the opposite: as decolonization 
makes its inexorable way forward, we must to do our best to keep up. 
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